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CELEBRITY MISREPRESENTATION &
THE FEDERAL LANHAM ACT:
THE PUBLIC FIGHTS BACK
ADAM HIRSCHFELDt
INTRODUCTION
America is a nation built upon notions of autonomy and
inimitability, so it is only natural that the country should be free
from the establishment of a national religion.' Despite the great
diversity of the United States, there is a form of idolatry shared
by many of its citizens: the worship of celebrities. 2 Celebrities
are viewed as role models. We trust their opinions, and we even
want to be them. These are essential qualities in the advertising
of commercial products, 3 so the celebrity is granted massive
potential for financial gain by choosing to associate his or her
persona with various products. In fact, celebrity endorsements 4
are such a "precious commodity"5 that they have frequently been
t J.D. Candidate, June 2004, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2001
Wesleyan University.
i The Establishment Clause of the Constitution states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 See Ziauddin Sardar, Trapped in the Human Zoo, NEW STATESMAN, Mar. 19,
2001, at 27 (expressing the opinion that we cannot help but feel fascinated with the
celebrity as a means of "escapism" from our ordinary lives).
3 Advertising is primarily intended to "persuade and influence," rather than to
"inform." Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection
of Trade Symbols, 108 YALE L.J. 1619, 1623 (1999). Celebrities often have the
capacity to increase a product's selling power. For example, Seagram's used Bruce
Willis' endorsement to give its wine coolers a "hip, grown-up image." Andrea Gabor
et al., Star Turns That Can Turn Star-Crossed, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 7,
1987, at 57.
4 An "endorser" is distinguished from a "spokesperson." See In re Diamond
Mortgage Corp. of Ill., 118 B.R. 588, 592-93 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989). An
"endorsement" is "any advertising message... which.., consumers are likely to
believe reflects the opinions ... of a party other than the sponsoring advertiser." 16
C.F.R. § 255.0 (2002).
5 Trebor Lloyd & Marc Lieberstein, Protecting the Celebrity Persona
Trademark, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, June 1995, at 8.
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stolen. 6  The general perception of such instances is that
financial rewards that rightly belonged to the celebrity have
been stolen through this form of exploitation. 7 The celebrity is
said to own the right to his or her likeness as a "right of
publicity. '8 A celebrity whose likeness has been misappropriated
may even be entitled to recover compensatory damages for
emotional distress9 or a damaged reputation.10
However, it is not just the celebrity who has been harmed by
a false endorsement, for the consumer is deceived into
purchasing through false celebrity endorsements. 1  What
6 See, e.g., Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 74-75 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (celebrity golfers' names used for commercial reasons
without their permission); see also Gary Susman, Dollars and Scents, EW.COM
(explaining that an ad featuring Tom Cruise and Nicole Kidman without their
permission made the famed actors feel like "involuntary models without pay"),
available at http://www.ew.com/ew/report/0,6115,352847-10-0-tomandnicolere
unite,00.html (last visited July 28, 2003).
7 Relief may be granted for a false designation of origin that is used in
commercial advertising or would be likely to cause confusion to consumers. This
would apply to advertisements that use a false celebrity endorsement, for which the
celebrity could recover because of profits lost to the advertiser. This is because the
consumer is likely to purchase advertised goods out of the erroneous belief that they
are actually endorsed by the celebrity. See Federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125
(2000). Additionally, entertainers have a "right to control [their] performance";
individuals are not permitted to use the performance for commercial gain without
payment to the entertainer who owns the rights to it. See Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565-66, 572 n.9 (1977) (holding that an
entertainer famous for a "human cannonball" act could recover against a television
station for broadcasting his performance without authorization because of the right
of performance (citing Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 490
(3rd Cir. 1956))).
s Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953) (creating the term "right of publicity" with reference to the right of
"prominent persons" to control the money received from their advertising
endorsements). But see Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979)
(holding that the right of publicity is personal to the artist and must be used during
his or her lifetime, and it is therefore not a property right).
9 California law allows recovery for mental distress. See Waits v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that singer Tom Waits was
entitled to recovery of "mental distress damages" against snack-food corporations
that misappropriated his voice for use in radio commercials). New York courts
applying the law of the forum with the greatest policy interest in the outcome of the
case in otrt actions, which has predominantly meant California, would reach the
same conclusion. See Clark v. Celeb Publ'g, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 979, 982 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
lO See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1104 ("We have no doubt.., that where the
misappropriation of identity causes injury to reputation, compensation for such
injury is appropriate.").
ix See generally Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First
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distinguishes a celebrity most significantly from members of the
general public is that the celebrity is a composite of two
personas: the private self and the public self. The right of
privacy purports to protect the seclusion of the celebrity from
"unwarranted and undesired publicity," 12 except when celebrities
choose to exploit their identities for financial gain. 13 The right of
publicity evolved out of the right of privacy to protect the
financial interests of celebrities who chose to interject their
presence into the public eye. 14  While the right of privacy
protects the private self of the celebrity and the right of publicity
protects the public self, both rights seem to be fundamentally
designed for the benefit of the public figure. 15
This Note will advance the position that when there has
been a false celebrity endorsement, consumers should be entitled
to compensatory relief and devoted fans should be entitled to
injunctive relief.1 6 Section 43(a) of the Federal Lanham Act
provides a civil remedy to "any person who believes that he or
she is likely to be damaged" by a false designation of origin,1 7
which has been interpreted to include members of the general
Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 75-76 (1994)
(positing that the right of publicity is meant to protect the consumer).
12 Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 92 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (quoting Jones v.
Herald Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 972, 973 (Ky. Ct. App. 1929)).
13 See Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 428 (holding that actor Bela Lugosi could have
chosen to exercise his right of publicity during his lifetime).
14 Prosser listed the following four elements of a right of privacy cause of action:
(1) intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude or into his private affairs; (2)
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity that
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; (4) appropriation, for the
defendant's advantage, of either the plaintiffs name or likeness. This fourth
element gave rise to the concept of a right of publicity. WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 802, 804 (4th ed. 1971). In Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953), the term "right of publicity" was first coined. See supra note 8; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (discussing the right of
publicity and "the commercial value of a person's identity").
15 See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th
Cir. 1983) (discussing how the right of privacy and the right of publicity differ).
16 There are numerous reasons why only injunctive relief should be awarded for
non-economic harm. See infra text and accompanying notes 102-06.
17 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). The Federal Lanham Act was originally enacted
in response to Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938), which
detracted from the federal unfair competition law at the time by holding that "there
[was] no federal general common law." See David Klein, The Ever Expanding
Section 43(a): Will the Bubble Burst?, 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 65, 65-67
(1993).
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public.18 More troublesome is the issue of whether or not the
general public is capable of bringing such actions when the
injury is not economic, since courts have explicitly prohibited
standing under the Lanham Act for such injuries, 19 unless an
individual has a reasonable basis for a belief of damage 20 and a
"real interest" in the proceedings. 21
Part I of the Note proposes two different forms of public
standing as satisfactory under the Federal Lanham Act. First,
there is a reconciliation of the ambiguities concerning consumer
standing under the Act. 22 Second, there is an argument in favor
of extending public standing beyond economic injuries to
encompass the public's response to scandalous
misrepresentations of celebrities. 23 Part II of the Note addresses
potential First Amendment objections to public standing under
the Lanham Act. Finally, Part III proposes safeguards in order
to prevent an excess of frivolous litigation that would occur if
public standing were found to exist in either form.
18 The Federal Lanham Act has been interpreted broadly to include the purpose
of preventing the deception of consumers through commercial misrepresentation.
See Yameta Co. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582, 586-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(holding that musician Jimi Hendrix and his licensed recording company were
entitled to an injunction to stop two unendorsed recording companies from selling
his recordings because of the likelihood that consumers would be misled into
believing that these recordings were endorsed by Hendrix), rev'd, 393 F.2d 91 (2d
Cir. 1968); see also Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d
538, 546 (2d Cir. 1956) (stating that the language of the Federal Lanham Act should
be construed broadly). But see Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442
F.2d 686, 691-92 (2d Cir. 1971) (interpreting the Federal Lanham Act narrowly by
holding that a group of students suing for false descriptions of a ski tour lacked
standing because consumers were not intended to be covered by the Lanham Act).
19 See Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
consumers lacked standing to bring a false advertising action in response to
misrepresentations used by a light bulb company because there was no commercial
or competitive injury).
20 There need only be a belief that damage could occur, not an actual showing of
damage. See Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (granting
standing to a Christian challenging the endowment of a trademark for the name
"O.J. Simpson" because of the name's scandalous association with spousal abuse,
which offended the plaintiffs moral values).
21 A "real interest" is defined as "a personal interest in the proceeding beyond
that of the general public." Id. at 1095.
22 See infra Part I.A.
23 See infra Part I.B.
CELEBRITY MISREPRESENTATION
I. STANDING
Article III of the Constitution requires that there be a
genuine "case or controversy" in order for any case to be heard in
federal court.24 Therefore, the party bringing an action must
meet the following requirements: (1) the plaintiff must have a
personal stake in the litigation, 25 (2) the injury must have been
directly caused by the defendant's actions,26 and (3) the court
must have the capacity to redress the plaintiffs injury.27 Of
these requirements, only the first poses an obstacle to public
standing, and the hurdle is extremely significant. Exceptions to
the general rule requiring a personal stake in the litigation have
included representational standing,28 standing of a disinterested
party on behalf of the interested party when there is a special
relationship between them,29 and taxpayer standing.30 Although
objections by members of the general public to instances of false
celebrity endorsements do not specifically fall within one of these
24 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
25 The prohibition on third parties bringing an action as "concerned bystanders"
on behalf of the parties that are truly injured exists in order to "prevent[] the
judicial process from becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973).
26 This requirement exists to prevent plaintiffs from claiming an injury that
actually "results from the independent action of some third party not before the
court." Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42 (1976).
27 Cf. L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-12 (1983) (holding that a man injured by
a policeman for a minor traffic infraction was not entitled to an injunction against
the police officer because there was no showing that the victim would be subjected
to future injuries by the policeman, so the remedy would not redress the injury).
28 When the injury to the public welfare is related to the purpose of an
organization, then each member of the organization is said to have an injury
capable of warranting standing. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738-39
(1972) (holding that Sierra Club lacked standing to seek injunctive relief when it
alleged only a "special interest" in preventing federal approval of a skiing
development in the Sequoia National Forest but recognizing that if the club had
asserted an individualized harm to its members or itself it would not be precluded
from bringing suit).
29 See, e.g., Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1302-03 (E.D. Mich. 1997)
(holding that doctors and clinics had standing to challenge the constitutionality of
Michigan's "partial-birth abortion" statute, even though women who wanted to have
abortions seemed to be the interested parties).
30 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101-03 (1968) (holding that federal
taxpayers had standing to challenge Congress's financing of instruction and
educational materials for religious schools because such action is barred by the
Establishment Clause).
20041
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exceptions, the public is fundamentally injured by such
deceptions. 31
A. Consumer Standing
In order to determine the merits of a famous individual's
claim for unfair competition under the Lanham Act, courts
examine the consumer's likelihood of confusion in response to a
false designation of origin.32 Peculiarly enough, while each of the
factors considered in the likelihood-of-confusion test3 3 appear to
be examined on behalf of the consumer, this test is only initiated
by the celebrity bringing a legal action.34 The flaw in this
application is the implication that consumers exist solely for the
benefit of the celebrity, as opposed to the converse. The right of
publicity "does not entitle [celebrities] to control their fans' use of
their own money."35
Certainly no one would dispute that an individual with a
"commercial interest"36 in competition with the defendant has
standing under the Lanham Act,37 but this conclusion does not
31 See Tawnya Wojciechowski, Letting Consumers Stand on Their Own: An
Argument for Congressional Action Regarding Consumer Standing for False
Advertising Under Lanham Act Section 43(a), 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 213, 244 (1994)
(examining consumer standing under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and the need
for Congress to clear up the ambiguity surrounding this section's intended
application to consumers).
32 See Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1461-62 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that
a claim for unfair competition is actionable only when there is an affirmative
showing of a likelihood of consumer confusion).
33 The following factors are commonly considered in determining the likelihood
of consumer confusion: "(1) strength of the plaintiffs mark; (2) relatedness of the
goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing
channels used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7) defendant's intent in selecting
the mark; (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines." White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats,
599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979)).
34 See, e.g., Condit v. Star Editorial, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1051-52 (E.D.
Cal. 2003) (holding that a non-celebrity who was the subject of an allegedly false
tabloid article suffered no injury to her commercial interests and therefore lacked
standing to bring a false association claim because she never stated that she
intended to make commercial use of her identity).
35 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir.
1992).
36 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992).
37 There is standing to sue for a "competitive injury" when the plaintiff and
defendant are in economic competition. See Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 211 F.3d 515, 520
(10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 873 (10th
Cir. 1995)).
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negate the additional possibility that an individual lacking a
competitive interest with the defendant is capable of developing
standing.38 In Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Organization,3 9 the
United States District Court for the Central District of
California held that consumers have standing to sue under the
Lanham Act 40 and need not rely solely upon the Federal Trade
Commission for a remedy. 41 In Arnesen, the court assessed the
plain language of the Lanham Act and stated that "it applies to
any person who is or is likely to be damaged."42 The court went
on to point out that the Lanham Act defines "person" as both a
juristic person and a natural person, 43 such that economic
competitors are clearly not the only ones intended to be protected
by the Act.44
There are two limitations imposed on claims for false
advertising under the Lanham Act. First, the defendant's
statement must have been false; second, this false statement
must have affected a portion of the buying public. 45 If a celebrity
is required to show that consumers are affected by his or her
false endorsement, then this should mean that consumers are
part of the class of persons "likely to be damaged" by the false
endorsement. 46 Thus, the Lanham Act should afford consumers
38 See Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, Standing to Bring False Advertising
Claim or Unfair Competition Claim Under § 43(a)(1) of Lanham Act, 124 A.L.R.
FED. 189, § 10(a)-(b) (1995).
39 333 F. Supp. 116 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
40 Id. at 117, 120 (holding that a consumer had standing to sue a company that
charged a fee to help inventors with processing patent applications, given that the
company falsely stated that no other services would be needed by the inventor than
the ones it provided to consumers).
41 Id. at 120. In determining whether the consumer is deceived, the Federal
Trade Commission considers the following factors: (1) whether there is a
"representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer," (2)
whether that act or practice would be deceiving to the reasonable consumer, (3)
whether that act or practice is material or would be 'likely to affect a consumer's
conduct." Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, to
The Honorable John D. Dingell, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce
(Oct. 14, 1983), http://www.ftc.govlbcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm (last visited Oct.
24, 2003).
42 Arnesen, 333 F. Supp. at 120 (emphasis added).
43 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
44 Arnesen, 333 F. Supp. at 120.
45 Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 648 (3d Cir.
1958).
46 See supra text accompanying note 17.
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protection and not merely benefit the celebrity whose
endorsement has been misappropriated.
B. Public Standing for Non-Economic (Scandalous) Injury
1. Reasonable Basis for Belief in Damage47
Largely for First Amendment reasons, 48  courts have
generally found that mere disapproval with the means in which
a celebrity likeness is used is an inappropriate basis for legal
action;49 however, such actions have been allowed for tarnished
trademarks. 50 One possible reason why courts have come out so
differently on this issue is that a trademark has no private self
with which to become insulted by inappropriate usage.51
However, a celebrity does not merely have a pecuniary worth, for
the celebrity carries a massive cultural significance,5 2 acts as a
role model,53 and wields considerable influence.5 4  So, for
47 See supra note 20.
48 Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("[T]he
publisher is in no different position than a painter who feels he needs certain
pigments and oils to create a contemplated masterpiece."). So long as the
unauthorized usage of a celebrity's image is only incidentally for commercial gain,
and primarily for creative usage, the usage cannot be challenged. Comedy III
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807-11 (Cal. 2001) (holding that
because the defendant used the likeness of the Three Stooges on lithographic prints
and T-shirts primarily for commercial gain, the plaintiffs "right of publicity" was
violated).
49 See, e.g., Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, 498 F. Supp. 401, 405-06
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that actress Ann-Margret could not challenge a depiction of
her nude from the waist up, taken out of the context of a tasteful movie in which she
appeared, simply on the basis of mere disapproval with the manner in which she
was depicted in the magazine).
50 See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that an adult movie that featured blatant
references to members of the Dallas Cowboy cheerleaders violated the trademark of
that organization under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act due to the likelihood of
confusion between the actual cheerleading organization and the tawdry film).
51 See Twist v. TCI Cablevision, No. SC84856, 2003 Mo. LEXIS 119, at *9 (Mo.
Aug. 4, 2003).
52 See generally Rosemary J. Coombe, Publicity Rights and Political Aspiration:
Mass Culture, Gender Identity, and Democracy, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1221 (1992)
(referring throughout to the "celebrity image" as representative of the cultural
phenomenon that is the celebrity's persona).
53 See Darryl C. Wilson, The Legal Ramifications of Saving Face: An Integrated
Analysis of Intellectual Property and Sport, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 227, 228-29
(1997) (discussing the manner in which athletes, who are in the public eye, are
commonly perceived as role models).
54 When a celebrity gets tested for a medical illness, it encourages members of
[Vol.78:233240
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example, a false endorsement for condoms featuring an actor
well-known for starring in family movies will clearly create an
association that could substantially mislead the general public. 55
False celebrity endorsements used in commercial
advertising have the capacity to dilute the mark of the
celebrity. 56 The Federal Lanham Act bars legal action to recover
for non-commercial dilution,57 but this does not mean that a non-
economic injury, such as offense taken to an advertisement,
caused by an economic injury, such as a false endorsement,
would be barred because such an injury is based upon public
deception. 58 There is also the potential for public harm when a
celebrity is portrayed through advertising in a manner that
would qualify as defamation.5 9  Although such alleged
the general public to also get tested, thereby promoting better health. For instance,
after former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani dropped out of the Senate race when
diagnosed with prostate cancer, the rates of testing for that particular illness went
up significantly. See Melissa Klein, More Men Getting Tested for Prostate Cancer,
JOURNAL NEWS (Westchester County, N.Y.), Mar. 27, 2000, at lB. However, such
media attention on celebrity illnesses and testing for diseases could have a
potentially negative impact by causing the public to panic by perceiving the disease
as more prevalent than it really is. See Janice Hopkins Tanne, Does Publicity About
Celebrity Illness Improve Public Health?, 174 W.J. MED. 94, 94-95 (2001)
(discussing how celebrities often speak publicly about their illnesses).
55 Cf. Girl Scouts of United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co, 304 F. Supp.
1228, 1231, 1233-34 (1969) (holding that the dilution doctrine did not apply where
there was no possibility of consumer confusion concerning a poster portraying a
pregnant girl wearing the Girl Scouts uniform, with the words "Be Prepared"
printed on the poster).
56 The "mark" of the celebrity is used to refer to the celebrity's persona in false
endorsement cases. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th
Cir. 1992) (applying an eight-factor test to determine likelihood of confusion of the
celebrity's endorsement). The strength of this "mark" is determined by "the level of
recognition the celebrity enjoys among members of society." Id. "[E]xcessive
commercial use... may dilute the value of the identity." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
57 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (2000).
58 See Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F.
Supp. 1521, 1535-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that the "commercial advertising or
promotion" requirement of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) is satisfied by showing an
intention to influence customers to buy defendant's goods or services, among other
factors). Thus, the only reason why a commercial misuse of a celebrity's likeness
must take place is that there must be some intention to influence, and thereby to
deceive, the public through this false influencing process.
59 A defamatory statement is defined as one that "harm[s] the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). It may be difficult for the celebrity to challenge
alleged defamatory material, however, as the more widely known an individual is,
then the less likely he or she will be to gain recovery. See New York Times Co. v.
2004]
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defamation has often been dressed up as beneficial to the
public,60 the ridicule which President Clinton was exposed to
while he was in office, for example, was arguably defamatory. 6
1
These statements served to undermine the public confidence in
our central political leader.62 Thus, if an advertiser for the
pornography industry were to misappropriate Clinton's likeness
in order to endorse their sleazy business, this should be
actionable by the public under the Lanham Act.
2. "Real Interest" in the Proceedings 63
The Supreme Court has held that no economic injury need
be shown in order to establish standing when an "aesthetic
injury" can be found instead.64 The fundamental principle of an
"aesthetic injury" is that a harm can denote standing despite
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that there must be a showing that
the individual who made the alleged defamatory statement either knew it was false
or acted with a "reckless disregard" toward the truthfulness of the statement). A
higher standard is held to "public figures" than private individuals because of the
"assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed
themselves to increased risk of injury" and the fact that public figures often have a
better chance of rebutting the defamatory statement than private individuals. Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
60 The media's negative portrayals of public figures can serve the public
interest by acting as "a consumer affairs watchdog." Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc.
v. Bergen Record Corp., 655 A.2d 417, 435 (N.J. 1995).
61 If characterizations of Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky went too far
beyond allegations of perjury and into attacks on his character, then the relevancy
to newsworthiness was lacking, and the news media was little different from the
tabloids that commercially exploit the likenesses of public figures. See Rodney A.
Smolla, Qualified Intimacy, Celebrity, and the Case for a Newsgathering Privilege,
33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1233, 1239-41 (2000). One Internet humor page even went so
far as to post the following joke: 'Why can't Bill Clinton file a defamation of
character suit against his critics? Because Bill Clinton has no character to defame."
The Bill Clinton (a.k.a. Slick Willie) Funnies Home Page, at http://www.srv.
net/~printery/ clinton.html (last visited July 28, 2003).
62 Public confidence is eroded when an independent counsel "[passes] judgment
on Clinton's character and behavior," since "[t]hat is the right of the American
public." Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Mr. Starr's Desperate Hours, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., July 21, 1997, at 64.
63 See supra note 21.
64 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973) (holding that students had standing to challenge the
Interstate Commerce Commission's decision not to suspend a surcharge on
interstate freight trains, since the high rates discouraged manufacturers from
recycling, thereby promoting increased pollution, an injury to the recreational
interests of the students).
[Vol.78:233
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being shared by a large group of people. 65 Although this type of
injury has typically been used to refer to environmental harms,
where pollution has threatened to impair the public's ability to
enjoy natural beauty, it has become an increasingly flexible
standard in recent years.66
If the violation of something deemed aesthetically pleasing
is sufficient to cause injury to an individual, then a harm
inflicted upon the aesthetic value of a celebrity with massive
appeal should qualify as "damage" within the meaning of the
Lanham Act. 67 For instance, many individuals took offense at
witnessing actor Fred Astaire being resurrected from the grave
in order to endorse the Dirt Devil vacuum cleaner in an
advertisement. 68  Since Astaire's surviving relatives did not
endorse the advertisement, the public should have an actionable
non-economic injury through the interpretation of the Lanham
Act advocated in this Note.
Additionally, there is an evidentiary issue involved in
proving that the members of the public suing for non-economic
injury caused by a false celebrity endorsement truly have an
affiliation that warrants such a claim. In United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,69 a harm
could be shown to the recreational interests of the students suing
because all were members of an organization whose interests
were affected. 70 Perhaps organizational standing for devoted
65 Id. at 686.
66 Cf. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 431-33 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (holding that the principle of an "aesthetic injury" could be extended to cover
the right of an individual not to witness animals being kept in inhumane conditions
on a game farm).
67 Cf. Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1828, 1830 (T.T.A.B.
1994) (holding that Native Americans had standing to challenge the trademark of
the Washington Redskins under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, since it consists of
"scandalous matter"); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000) (barring the registration of a
trademark containing any matter that might "falsely suggest a connection with
persons" and is "immoral, deceptive, or scandalous").
68 See Joseph J. Beard, Clones, Bones and Twilight Zones: Protecting the Digital
Persona of the Quick, the Dead and the Imaginary, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1165,
1228 (2001); cf. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting
Frederico Fellini, director of "Ginger and Fred," in explaining that Fred Astaire and
leading lady Ginger Rogers were "glamorous and care-free symbol[s]" of their time).
This "care-free" nature of Astaire's dance style was certainly never used in the
movies to sell products like vacuum cleaners, and many people, therefore, believe
that it is an offensive association.
69 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
70 Each member of the organization (SCRAP) was adversely affected by injuries
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fans of a celebrity could be shown by membership in a particular
fan club for that celebrity.7 1
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICT
When there is a public expectation about the type of
performance that a celebrity will give based on the prior roles
that the celebrity has had-for example, John Wayne starring as
the classic tough guy-then the celebrity is analogous to a
fictional character for which there is a trademark in his or her
likeness.7 2  The problem with actors who have become so
engrained in popular culture, however, is that they have become
representative of certain symbols or concepts 73 and are therefore
part of the public domain. On the other hand, a fictionalized
character is a product that belongs specifically to its creator, for
which any violation is actionable. 74  Therefore, while an
individual or a company owns the rights to a copyrighted
that were relevant to the purpose of their organization or were within their "zone of
interests." Id. at 678, 686.
71 By showing affiliation with an organization, a member suing on behalf of the
"public interest" is more than just a "concerned bystander." Id. at 687.
72 See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1358 (D.N.J. 1981). Since
the persona of a celebrity is a commercially constructed entity designed to "induce
the consumer to buy goods for reasons independent of the intrinsic value or quality
of the goods themselves," the "commercial persona" is essentially identical to a
trademark, warranting the same types of protection. Lloyd and Lieberstein, supra
note 5, at 8 n.2. See, e.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 922 (3d Cir. 1994)
(holding that the financial gains from usage of the character "Spanky McFarland"
from the Little Rascals belonged to actor George McFarland and were descendible to
his survivors, since the name had become "entwined in the public mind" with the
actor). It may not even be necessary to use the name or likeness of the celebrity in
order to violate the celebrity's rights, for courts have allowed recovery when an
identifiable aspect of a celebrity's personality is robbed. See Landham v. Lewis
Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447
F. Supp. 723, 726-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that renowned boxer Muhammad Ali
was entitled to an injunction against Playgirl magazine for printing a picture of a
nude black male in a boxing ring identified solely as the "Mystery Man," but
accompanied by the phrase "the Greatest," because the context of this picture
clearly identified Ali).
73 See supra note 52.
74 See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978)
(holding that there was a copyright infringement of the characters of Walt Disney
when they were used without authorization in several adult comic books, since
these characters have "unique elements of expression" and are not "unprotected
idea[s]").
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character, the public essentially owns the rights to the
celebrity. 75
Allowing public standing for offensive portrayals of
celebrities could have paradoxical effects. The public would be at
opposition with itself, between those individuals offended by a
particular instance and those who think that the challenged
instance should be permitted as a valid form of expression
protected by the First Amendment. In copyright cases, courts
apply a "total concept and feel test"7 6 in order to determine if the
essence of the copyrighted material or character has been copied
or if there has been a valid creative expression under the First
Amendment. 77 Perhaps this test can be adopted to determine
when the thin line between creative expression and harm to the
fans of celebrities has been crossed. In Winter v. DC Comics,78
the court considered a portrayal of the famous musicians, the
Winter Brothers, as characters, depicted as monsters, in a comic
book. 79  Applying a "transformative use" test,80 the court
analyzed whether the creative gain or financial gain was
75 The public is generally responsible for making the celebrity who he or she is,
for without the "public choice" favoring a particular celebrity and giving him or her
fame, there cannot be a "celebrity." See Steven C. Clay, Starstruck: The
Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L.
REV. 485, 502-03 (1994) (discussing that because the public "determines a
celebrity's role and image in our popular culture," the public's "property rights" in
that celebrity should not be ignored).
76 The test is applied from the perspective of the "ordinary observer," in which
the work is considered as a whole. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429
F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that the similarities of the art work,
lettering, arrangement of words, and the particular mood conveyed by the message
of greeting cards produced and sold by different companies constituted trademark
infringement).
7 See supra note 49.
78 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
79 Id. at 479-80.
8o Id. at 477-80. This test has largely been adopted from the purpose and
character of the "fair use" defense under copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
For instance, the "fair use" defense was raised in connection with Dustin Hoffman's
lawsuit in order to defend Los Angeles Magazine's publication of a photograph of
Hoffman dressed in designer clothing. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33
F. Supp. 2d 867, 875 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd, 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). This
defense failed since, as Judge Tevrizian stated, the use of Hoffman's name and
likeness "crossed over the line between editorial content and advertising' and that
Hoffman was "violated by technology." California Court Awards Dustin Hoffman $3
Million for Use of Name, Likeness, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: INTELL. PROP., Vol. 7, Feb.
1, 1999. There is often a thin line between creative expression and financial pursuit,
but it is the court's task to decide which of these goals is primary.
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incidental.81  When the creative expression is primary, the
celebrity is in no position to sue because the public's right to self-
expression must be protected. The court, however, failed to
consider that members of the public could be offended by this
portrayal of the musicians, choosing only to examine the rights
of the celebrities.8 2
In this Note, a two-part test is proposed to determine when
the public is entitled to bring an action for non-economic harm.
First, there is a portrayal of a celebrity that would cause harm to
the public. Second, the portrayal is used primarily for the
economic gain of the defendant. The "aesthetic injury" of the
public is still the fundamental injury, but it becomes actionable
only when presented in a form that is primarily for financial
gain, rather than as protected creative expression.8 3 Another
possible approach is to conclude that First Amendment interests
can be completely discarded in the interest of ensuring consumer
protection.8 4 Courts have generally not permitted individuals
attempting to make false statements to seek protection under
the blanket of the First Amendment.8 5 To this extent, the second
element of the test previously advocated can be modified as
follows: the portrayal need not be used primarily for the
economic gain of the defendant. Thus, for either economic or
non-economic injuries caused to the public, such a wrong is
actionable when there was a misleading presentation of a
celebrity that could confuse the public.8 6 There is good cause to
expand the law beyond its current form to cover the non-
economic injuries of the public, but with significant limitations to
prevent an onslaught of excessive and unnecessary litigation.8 7
81 Winter, 69 P.3d at 478.
82 See id.
83 See supra note 80.
84 "Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading ... is subject to restraint.
Since the advertiser knows his product and has a commercial interest in its
dissemination, we have little worry that regulation to assure truthfulness will
discourage protected speech." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383
(1977) (citation omitted).
85 See, e.g., Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 949 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that it is constitutional to restrain deceptive advertising, so long as it is not
merely "puffery").
86 If a celebrity appears in a movie without having given the authorization for
his or her appearance, this is also misleading to the public. For instance, footage of
President Clinton was used without his approval in the film "Contact." Beard, supra
note 68, at 1206.
87 See infra Part III.
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Without such limitations, the rights of the public would become
superior to those of the celebrity, making a mockery of the
concepts of the right to privacy and the right of publicity, which
were intended to protect both the personal and financial
interests of the celebrity.
III. SEALING OFF THE FLOODGATES OF EXCESSIVE LITIGATION
A. General Substantive Safeguard Measures
In order to prevent excessive litigation by the public,88
certain safeguards are necessary or else the celebrity's rights are
in danger of becoming subservient to those of the public. One of
these safeguards should be to permit celebrities to tarnish their
own image through whatever commercial association they see fit
without fear of reprisal by members of the general public.8 9
After all, the Federal Lanham Act was only designed to prevent
"any false designation of origin,"90 not simply an undesirable
statement, yet an undesirable statement coupled with a false
designation of origin should still be actionable on the basis of its
offensive nature because the influence over the general public is
then a deception. 91
The public must also be restrained from bringing legal
action when the public figure whose name or likeness has been
misappropriated is not a "celebrity." For the purpose of this
Note, a "celebrity" is any individual with a well-known and
celebrated reputation that is financially viable. As important as
an individual may be to the functioning of society, such as a
politician, only those who are well known by the public can be
considered "celebrities." 92 This is not to say that individuals who
88 Wojciechowski, supra note 31, at 227.
89 But see Alice Trillin, Blowing Smoke, THE NATION, July 19, 1999, at 6
(arguing that celebrities should not smoke in their movies because it encourages
youths to purchase more cigarettes through an attempt to identify with the
celebrity).
90 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
91 See supra note 58.
92 Bill Clinton is an example of a well-known politician that would qualify as a
"celebrity" within this definition. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. In fact,
famous politicians have appeared in advertisements, such as Bob Dole's
endorsements of Pepsi and Viagra. Beard, supra note 68, at 1206 n.223. An
individual of economic importance that would not qualify as a "celebrity" is the
former president of the New York Stock Exchange, Richard Grasso. Since most
people do not know who Grasso is, and of those people who do, most would not
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are not in the public eye are incapable of bringing a legal action
for defamation, 93 but merely that such individuals lack a right of
publicity.
B. Procedural Safeguards
1. Determination of Damages
Consumers attempting to recover for purchases made as a
result of a false celebrity endorsement should be entitled to
compensatory damages, as if there were an economic injury
sustained. It remains to be seen how this measure of damages
can be calculated. A contract is created between the
manufacturer and the purchaser whenever a consumer buys a
product, such that a product that fails to live up to its
expectations creates an action for breach of contract. 94 For a
misrepresentation, plaintiffs are awarded their reliance
interest, 95 the value that the consumer spent on the faulty
product, 96 as opposed to their expectation interest,97 the value of
believe that his name could be associated with the posting of crude messages on the
Internet, the likelihood of confusion test cannot be satisfied in this situation. See
generally N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. Gahary, 196 F. Supp. 2d 401, 409-11 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (discussing the likelihood-of-confusion test and explaining, "If no one has any
idea who Richard Grasso is, Gahary cannot be accused of trying to free-ride on the
former's name").
93 See supra note 59. If statements could not possibly "give rise to an
impression that they are true," then there cannot be a defamatory statement in the
first place. Cf. Frank v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 119 A.D.2d 252, 257, 506 N.Y.S.2d 869,
872-73 (2d Dep't 1986) (holding that there was no defamation where an unknown
tax consultant believed himself to be mocked by a comedy sketch program on
television that used his name, since there could be no impression that the character
portrayed in the routine was actually referring to the plaintiff).
94 There is an implied warranty of merchantability on all goods sold, provided
that the seller is knowledgeable about the type of good sold. See U.C.C. § 2-314
(2002). This implied warranty ensures that the goods be "fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used." U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c). When there is a
material misrepresentation of the quality of the goods as promised, a plaintiff may
recover for breach of contract. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, PROSSER, WADE AND
SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 1009-10 (Robert C. Clark ed., 10th ed. 2000).
95 The "reliance interest" is defined as that measure of damages necessary to
put the plaintiff "in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not
been made." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(b) (2001); see, e.g., Baker
v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 175 Misc. 951, 954-55, 673 N.Y.S.2d 281,
283-84 (Yonkers City Ct. 1998) (holding that a consumer could recover the cost
spent on a fur coat that shed excessively, allegedly promoting plaintiffs allergies).
96 Provided that there is an implied warranty of merchantability, consumers
can recover all appropriate costs, including the purchase price. U.C.C. § 2-714 .
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the product if the representations by the defendant were true.
Yet there is nothing actually wrong with a product purchased
through reliance upon a false celebrity endorsement, except that
the famous individual trusted by a consumer did not give his or
her seal of approval, which the celebrity is often not qualified to
do anyway. 98
In order to determine the compensatory damages for a false
celebrity endorsement, the expectation interest is what matters,
since the consumer bought a product based on the expectation
that the celebrity approved of its usage.99 Therefore, this can be
calculated as follows: the difference between the value of the
product if it were actually endorsed by the celebrity and the
actual value of the product that is not endorsed by the
celebrity. 100  In other words, if a celebrity's endorsement is
valuable in considering whether to make a purchase, 10' then
there is a large difference between what the consumer expected
and what was actually received, so damages should be high. On
the other hand, if the only advantage the defendant seller
received from the false celebrity endorsement was the benefit of
attaching a celebrity's name to the product, then there is a
relatively small difference between what was expected and what
was actually received, so damages should be small.
When the injury sustained is not purely "economic,"'1 2 only
injunctive relief should be granted. There are several reasons to
impose such a restriction. First, if the public were allowed to
97 The "expectation interest" is defined as that measure of damages necessary
to put the plaintiff "in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract
been performed." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a).
98 For instance, if an athlete were to endorse a product affiliated with sports in
some way, then the celebrity's endorsement of that product is valuable in
influencing the consumer's decision whether or not to purchase it. Cf. Palmer v.
Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (holding
that renowned professional golfers could enjoin the makers of a golf game that
contained data about the golfers without their permission, since the celebrities may
not want to capitalize on their athletic recognition). On the other hand, if a celebrity
like Tom Cruise were to endorse a cooking utensil, as opposed to the famous chef
Emeril Lagasse, then the celebrity's opinion about the product would be less
valuable, even though the admiration of the celebrity would probably still motivate
sales.
99 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
100 This would put the consumer back in the position that he or she would have
been in if the contract had been properly performed-had the celebrity truly
endorsed the product. See supra note 97.
101 See supra note 98.
102 See supra Part I.A.
20041
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
bring class actions10 3 for compensatory relief whenever offended,
there would be extensive payoffs and a surplus of frivolous
litigation. On the other hand, if a member of the public were
suing for injunctive relief, he or she would have nothing to gain
from obtaining an injunction other than to alleviate future
personal offense, and that individual could sue on behalf of the
entire community of devoted fans. Second, despite the
possibility that an action brought by members of the general
public would be moot if a celebrity had already filed for an
injunction to stop the offending message, 104 a celebrity may fail
to exercise his or her existing legal remedies, 10 5 in which case the
public would continue to remain deceived. Third, the public is
often in a better position than the celebrity to judge when a false
endorsement has gone too far, since the public is responsible for
determining who gets to be a "celebrity."10 6
2. Res Judicata Problems
A further dilemma in awarding relief to the public lies in the
potential for parties to take advantage of prior holdings through
principles of res judicata. 10 7 For instance, a celebrity may choose
to wait until a member of the general public brings an action for
injunctive relief on the issue of whether the offending
advertisement deceived the public in order to lock in
compensatory damages without even having to prove the merits
103 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
104 Cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1974) (holding that an
action initiated by a student against a law school for racial discrimination was moot
because the student's graduation from the law school was already imminently
pending, and any decision of the Court would be nothing more than an advisory
opinion).
105 Cf. id. at 319 (stating that although petitioner could not exercise a legal
remedy, it would not preclude any other individual affected by the unlawful practice
from seeking legal redress).
106 See supra note 75.
107 Parties or their "privies" are forbidden to relitigate an issue that has already
been determined. Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 122 P.2d 892,
894 (Cal. 1942) (holding that the executor of an estate could not sue a bank where
beneficiaries under the will had previously brought an action and the executor could
have joined in it, being in "privity" with the beneficiaries). A "privy" can be defined
as any individual who is "directly interested in the subject matter, and had a right
to... control the proceeding." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the celebrity
would be in privity with an individual of the public suing for the use of that
celebrity's false endorsement because the public would stand in the shoes of the
celebrity in bringing an action.
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of his or her claim.'08 This problem could also work contrary to
the interests of the celebrity, such as when the advertiser defeats
a suit brought by a member of the public and then tries to bar
the celebrity from later suing on that same claim. It is unlikely,
however, that either attempt at preclusion would be
successful.109
CONCLUSION
While the law in its current form is ambiguous on the issue
of public standing, the plain language of the Lanham Act
supports the proposition that consumers should be entitled to
bring actions for false celebrity endorsements. 110 The legislature
must take an explicit stance on this issue in order for the courts
to determine how to rule."' The public has a unique
relationship with the celebrity that warrants public protection
from deception in advertising 1 2 and from unendorsed celebrity
statements that could have an adverse impact on the public at
large. 113
108 See id. (stating that a plea of res judicata may be asserted against a party
who is "bound by the earlier litigation in which the matter was decided").
109 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979) (holding
that non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel is not permitted when the plaintiff
could have joined in the earlier action and was adopting a wait-and-see attitude to
cash in on a certain victory); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334,
338 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that in order to be precluded in a subsequent action, the
party must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the previous action).
110 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (providing a civil remedy for "any person who
believes that he or she is likely to be damaged by [the deceptive] act") (emphasis
added).
1 Congress previously considered amending the language of the Federal
Lanham Act to include consumers. H.R. 5372, 100th Cong. (2d Sess. 1988).
112 See supra Part I.A.
113 See supra Part I.B.
2004]
ST JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
